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Abstract Two approaches to systems-level memory con-
solidation are contrasted. The standard model and multiple
trace theory are spelled out, their implications are outlined,
and their fit to the data from a number of approaches is
evaluated. We conclude that the data from neuroimaging
studies strongly support multiple trace theory, that data
from neuropsychological studies favor but does not
conclusively support multiple trace theory, while evidence
from a new approach, the study of prospective memory,
also supporting multiple trace theory, offers a promising
new way to distinguish between these two theories. Work
with animals is largely consistent with this conclusion. We
suggest that the hippocampal and neocortical systems are
critical for different forms of memory, and that the shift of
memory from dependence on hippocampus to dependence
on neocortex during consolidation is a reflection of the fact
that memory often is transformed with time, becoming
more generic in nature. Insofar as detailed episodic
recollections are retained, the data show that they are
dependent on the hippocampal system, much as multiple
trace theory postulated.
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The idea that memories are “consolidated” at the systems
level emerged about 60 years ago from two key findings:
Russell and Nathan [73] showed that the retrograde
amnesia (RA) resulting from brain trauma can last days or
even months, and Scoville and Milner [77] showed that
resection of the hippocampus apparently caused both
anterograde amnesia and RA, the latter lasting as long as
several years. Because it was thought that the short-term
(STM) and long-term memory (LTM) capacities of the
patient H.M. were intact, it was concluded that parts of the
medial temporal lobe (MTL) played some critical, although
unspecified, role in transferring memories from STM to
LTM. Interest focused quite soon on the hippocampus
within the MTL (see [65]).
For some time this notion of transfer was taken literally;
it was assumed that a given memory was initially “stored”
in hippocampal circuits, and then somehow transferred or
reestablished in extrahippocampal (likely neocortical)
memory sites. Perhaps the first statement of this position
was contained in Marr’s [44] model of the hippocampal
system. The more general idea that systems consolidation
(or prolonged consolidation, compared to synaptic [Dudai
2004] or rapid consolidation [Moscovitch 2000] involved
long-term interactions between hippocampal and extrahip-
pocampal circuits was expressed in an article by Squire et
al. [79]. The “standard model of memory consolidation”
(henceforth SMC) emerged from these writings. It is
important to note at the outset that this model was
originally intended to apply to explicit forms of memory,
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including both episodic and semantic memory,1 although
these terms were not in use in the 1950s and 1960s (see
[60] for a recent discussion of the emergence of ideas about
multiple memory systems). The fact that early discussion of
systems consolidation concerned only one type of memory
is important in understanding the theories that emerged and
their limitations. More recently it has become clear that
systems-level consolidation, understood as interactions
between multiple brain systems influencing LTM storage,
might be occurring also for implicit forms of memory, but
in this case the relevant structures are other than the
hippocampus and its neighbors in the MTL.2 Our focus
here will be on explicit memories and the standard model
offered to explain how these kinds of memories are
consolidated, because this is really what the historical
debate is all about. It will be interesting in the future to ask
whether the principles that apply to systems consolidation
in explicit memory are also relevant for implicit memory.
The standard model supposes that the hippocampus
plays a time-limited role in memory storage, either by first
storing and then transferring a memory, or by acting as an
index (cf. [83] for an early formulation of this indexing
idea) that binds extrahippocampal storage sites during a
period when direct communication among these sites is
inadequate to permit memory retrieval. As a function of
replay, either during rehearsal or offline, these extrahippo-
campal sites acquire the ability to interact such that the
hippocampus is no longer needed to retrieve the memory.
Initially a supporting argument held that there is limited
capacity within hippocampal circuits, creating a need to
recycle hippocampal neurons back into a pool of available
elements for new memory formation (e.g., [3]). When
extrahippocampal sites can interact to retrieve memories,
the hippocampus is no longer needed and systems-level
memory consolidation is said to be complete. Before this
time normal memory retrieval requires hippocampal in-
volvement. Within this model little was said about the time
course of changes in the strength of memory representa-
tions in hippocampal and extrahippocampal circuits. Is it
because the former is weakening even as the latter is
strengthening? If so, how could they still support retrieval?
If not, are hippocampal traces suddenly erased just when
extrahippocampal traces reached coherency? Or does the
hippocampus continue to contribute as it did before
consolidation, but in a way that is complementary rather
than necessary? Questions of this kind were rarely, if ever,
asked.
Notwithstanding the lack of the kind of details just
noted, SMC gained rapid acceptance in the field (cf. [78]),
entering the textbooks as a fact about memory and the
brain. Questions about this approach came from researchers
working both with humans (e.g., [88–90]; Kinsbourne and
Wood 1975) and with animal models (e.g., [38]), but their
concerns were not considered sufficient to challenge the
main ideas expressed in the standard view. One frequently
sees uncritical acceptance of SMC in both the scientific and
nonscientific literature—the hippocampus, in this view, is
only important for memory for a brief interlude.
A challenge to the standard theory
About 10 years ago we began to question SMC seriously
[51, 61, 62]. Based on a comprehensive review of the
existing literature we concluded that SMC suffered from
quite serious problems. Some of these were empirical,
whereas others were conceptual, and several were severe
enough to cast doubt on SMC.
Problems with SMC
The problems with SMS are as follows:
1. The apparent extent of RA, hence the length of the
consolidation period, varies with both the memory task
being tested and the method used to produce amnesia,
e.g., lesions, electroconvulsive shock, immersion in
cold water, or the injection of protein synthesis
inhibitors. To complicate matters further, the animal
literature measures consolidation in hours, days, or
weeks at most, whereas the human neuropsychological
literature measures consolidation in years, if not decades.
2. Insofar as one imagines a transfer of memory from
hippocampal to extrahippocampal sites, no empirically
2 The terminology for MTL structures is not consistent in the
literature. Here, the hippocampus proper refers to the cornu ammonis
fields and dentate gyrus. The hippocampal formation includes the
hippocampus proper and the subiculum, whereas the hippocampal
complex includes the hippocampal formation plus entorhinal and
perirhinal cortex, and the parahippocampal cortex. Both SMC and
MTT discuss consolidation with respect to the hippocampus proper.
Whereas proponents of both theories recognize the importance of
other MTL structures in memory encoding and retrieval, neither
theory makes strong claims regarding the specific roles these
structures may play, or how they interact with one another.
1 There is considerable disagreement about which terms to use in
referring to various kinds of memory. Whereas episodic and semantic
memory are relatively well defined, the umbrella terms embracing
both of these, explicit or declarative memory, are each fraught with
difficulty. The former, with its partner implicit memory, was
introduced not as the name for a memory system, but rather as a
description of the methods used to assess it. The latter, with its
original partner procedural memory, was introduced as a name for a
memory system, but it has proven virtually impossible to define in a
noncircular way. We prefer the theory-neutral nature of the terms
“explicit” and “implicit,” while acknowledging that explicit memory
is not a “system.”
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supported mechanism to accomplish this has been
offered. If one imagines that memory is always stored
in extrahippocampal sites, but requires hippocampal
involvement early on for coherent retrieval, then no
mechanism is proposed by virtue of which coherent
retrieval without hippocampal involvement becomes
possible. Do connections that already exist become
stronger? Do new connections grow among the neuronal
populations involved? Is there any evidence for either of
these possibilities? (but see Murre et al. 2002 for a
discussion of recent attempts to address these issues).
3. The SMC, treating episodic and semantic memory as
equivalent, offers no account of how, over time,
episodic memories appear to become more semantic
in nature. That is, we know that over time episodic
detail is lost whereas “gist” is preserved, but SMC
offers no way of understanding how and why this
happens. The model proposed by McClelland et al. [48]
does address this question, but in the process it ignores
the continuing presence of episodic memory.
Given these and other weaknesses of the standard theory,
Nadel and Moscovitch [61] generated a new model called
the multiple trace theory (henceforth MTT; see Estes 1955
and Hintzman 1986 for mention of multiple traces in
cognitive models of anterograde memory), which sought to
account for the facts of systems-level consolidation in a
novel way. This model built on the “cognitive map theory”
of hippocampal function [64] and the component process
model [49, 50] but went beyond them in a number of ways
(cf. [55] for a comprehensive discussion of the relations
among these models).
MTT made a range of predictions, most prominently the
idea that retrieval of remote memories would engage the
hippocampal complex, in contrast to what SMC predicted.
In the remainder of this paper we will review the current
literature, both in studies with humans and other animals,
with an eye toward resolving this debate (see Moscovitch
et al. [53–55] for extensive treatment of many of these
issues).
We start with more precise statements of both SMC and
MTT, focusing on the central predictions of each position.
We then review the literature. We review studies in humans
using both neuroimaging and neuropsychological methods;
each approach allows one to ask different questions. We
follow with a short discussion of studies in experimental
animals (mostly rodents), which have tried to unravel some
of the thornier questions that often cannot be asked in
studies with humans. We conclude that although some
issues remain to be resolved, the weight of the evidence at
present strongly favors MTT.
The two positions explained
SMC and its predictions
According to SMC, in its current incarnation, all explicit
memories (e.g., both episodic and semantic) are always
stored in extrahippocampal circuits. The hippocampal
contribution is in the form of an “index,” which serves to
bind together the disparate neocortical sites representing the
various parts of an episode, or the semantic structure
abstracted from related episodes. This position seems to
make a number of critical predictions that contrast it with
MTT:
1. All the “information” inherent in an explicit memory is
to be found in neocortical circuits, not in hippocampal
circuits. Thus, a memory, independent of the hippo-
campus, contains the same information that it would
contain were the hippocampal system available, either
before or after the completion of consolidation (cf. p.
424 in [48]). The implication is that remote episode
memories retrieved by individuals with amnesia must
be as fully detailed as remote episode memories
retrieved by individuals with intact brains. Note that
this need not imply that remote memories contain as
much detail as more recent memories, just that the
absence of the hippocampus cannot influence the
qualitative nature of a memory retrieved after it is
consolidated (cf. p. 141 in [5]), assuming that such
consolidation happened while the hippocampus was
intact.
2. Given that the hippocampus is not involved in retrieval
of remote memories, such retrieval should not be
accompanied by activation in the hippocampus.3
3. Both forms of explicit memory, episodic and semantic,
are treated the same with regard to systems consolida-
tion. Both start out dependent upon the hippocampus,
and both end up independent of it.
MTT and its predictions
According to MTT, memories are stored jointly in
hippocampal and extrahippocampal circuits, and rather
different things happen to episodic and semantic memory.
This leads to a somewhat different set of predictions:
3 This prediction reflects the initial formulation of SMC before the
advent of neuroimaging methods. Such methods make it clear that
hippocampus is activated when remote memories are retrieved.
Updated versions of SMC argue that such activation reflects encoding
of new memories rather than retrieval of remote ones (see below).
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1. The information inherent in an episodic memory is
contained in both hippocampal and extrahippocampal
circuits, such that remote episode memories retrieved
by individuals with amnesia should not be qualitatively
the same as remote episode memories retrieved by
individuals with intact brains.
2. Given that the hippocampus is involved in retrieval of
certain aspects of remote episode memory, such
retrieval should be accompanied by activation in the
hippocampus.
3. The two forms of explicit memory, episodic and
semantic, are not treated the same with regard to
systems consolidation. According to MTT, episodic
memories always remain dependent upon hippocampal
circuits, at least for their most detailed expression.
Semantic memories, on the other hand, can be
independent of hippocampal circuitry in just the way
standard theory suggests. That is, semantic information
is always represented in extrahippocampal circuits, and
the process of consolidation acts to strengthen these
circuits and to integrate newly acquired semantic
information into existing stores.
Contrasting predictions
Given these distinctions, it is clear that three areas of
empirical investigation and three seemingly simple ques-
tions are central to distinguishing between SMC and MTT:
1. Are remote memories retrieved by amnesics as fully
detailed as remote memories retrieved by intact
individuals (SMC) or are there qualitative differences
(MTT)?
2. Is the hippocampus activated by retrieval of remote
episodic memories (MTT) or not (SMC)?
3. Do episodic and semantic memories suffer the same
fate during consolidation and in amnesia (SMC) or are
they affected differently (MTT)?
Although these questions appear to be simple ones, of
course they turn out to be much more complicated once
one tries to answer them definitively. To start, the first
question raises complex issues about the methods used to
elicit remote memory retrievals. The second question can
only be addressed in neuroimaging contexts, and runs into
the problem of separating retrieval from encoding. The
third question itself begs the issue of the relation between
episodic and semantic memory. In the literature review
that follows, we highlight these problems while trying to
reach a conclusion about the merits of the two theoretical
positions.
The nature of remote memory in human amnesics
Episodic memory
The initial formulation of SMC and views of systems
consolidation in general had consolidation limited to weeks
in rodents and monkeys and to about 3–10 years, at the
outside, in humans. It is now clear, contrary to these early
claims, that large MTL lesions produce a RA that extends
for decades, consistent with the initial formulation of MTT,
that the extent and severity of RA is determined by the size
of MTL lesions (for different evidence regarding this
prediction, see Kopelman et al. 2004; Gilboa et al. 2005).
Having abandoned their earlier position and conceded that
RA is extensive, proponents of SMC now focused their
major point of contention on whether episodic, autobio-
graphical memory from the most remote time periods,
usually childhood and early adulthood, is preserved or
impaired when damage is limited to the MTL. Another
issue is whether damage limited to the hippocampal
formation can produce a temporally extensive RA at all.
Proponents of MTT and SMC have offered functional and
anatomical accounts for the current discrepancy among
studies, respectively.
According to the functional account favored by MTT,
hippocampal involvement in episodic memory is defined by
the recollective quality and detail of the remembered event.
Because most autobiographical memories lose their vivid-
ness and detail as they age [36], memories of amnesic and
normal people may appear equally impoverished at remote
periods if memory is queried insufficiently. The Autobio-
graphical Memory Interview (AMI) [31], a standard test of
remote episodic and semantic personal memory used in
most studies, may reveal differences between controls and
amnesics in some cases. In other cases, however, special
interviewing and scoring procedures may be needed. For
example, in the patient H.M., such tests have revealed
extensive memory loss dating to early life [81], although on
less sensitive tests his RA appeared more limited, leading to
the conclusion that his remote memories were relatively
normal [11, 77].
Although Bayley et al. [5, 6], using more sensitive tests,
still reported no difference between amnesic people with
large MTL lesions and controls at the most remote time
period, these data should be interpreted with caution. The
number of details recalled by their controls was far less than
that reported by controls in other studies [36], nor was there
any evidence of the typical loss of memory with aging in
their control subjects, a finding inconsistent with most of
the work in this area. Differences in testing procedure and
scoring may account for some of these discrepancies. What
is more worrying, however, is this group’s report that
patients with lesions confined to the MTL had ungraded
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deficits in semantic memory lasting at least 40 years in one
study [68]. It is highly unusual for RA to be far more severe
for semantic than episodic memory in such cases, suggest-
ing that the method used by Bayley et al. to test episodic
memory may not have been sensitive enough.
This point is brought out most clearly in their most
recent study. Despite evidence regarding the insensitivity of
the AMI, Bayley et al. (2006) used it to assess remote
autobiographical memory. Not surprisingly, memory was
hardly affected even for events occurring in early adulthood
in people with extensive MTL damage, who also had
substantial damage to the insula and inferior temporal
cortex. Interestingly, however, these very same patients had
an extensive RA for public (news) events, which extended
to over 50 years in one case. One reason is that it was much
more difficult to obtain a high score on the news events
tests, which included quite difficult items (e.g., What tire
manufacturer recalled thousands of tires [answer: Fire-
stone]) compared to the test for autobiographical memory,
which depended on a laxer and more subjective scoring
method. Thus, whereas controls performed at or near
ceiling on the AMI, receiving scores close to the maximum
of 9/9, they scored at only 60% correct for recent news
events, and dropped to 40% correct for news events that
occurred 10 or more years earlier. These findings under-
score the need to use a comparable metric for testing both
types of memory, as Steinvorth et al. [81] did in their study.
The anatomical account favored by SMC attributes the
difference between extensive and temporally limited RA to
lesion size and location. Drawing on carefully documented
neuroanatomical analysis of a series of amnesic patients,
Bayley et al. conclude that RA encompassing the earliest
periods of life is found only in patients whose damage
extends beyond the MTL to regions of the neocortex, a
finding supported, in part, by Bright et al. (2006). In their
view, damage confined to the MTL spares memories for the
most remote periods, although in the study of Bright et al,
there is a suggestion that memory is impaired at the most
remote period even in people with lesions confined to the
hippocampus proper. The deficit fails to reach significance
probably because of the low power of the test caused by
variability in performance and the low number of subjects
tested. Other cases, however, show RA across the life span
even when the lesions are confined to the hippocampal
formation (see Table 1 in [55]), and more specifically just
to the fornix [67], which contains the major projections of
the hippocampus. At least one of those cases, V.C., is as
well documented neuroanatomically as the cases in the
series of Bayley et al. [8] and, except for memory loss, is at
least as cognitively intact. Moreover, the cases of Bayley et
al. with the most extensive damage to MTL also have
considerable damage to the insula and inferior temporal
cortex, indicating that it is not likely to be the extent of
extrahippocampal damage that accounts for the differences
in RA observed among the different cases, but the way in
which memory was evaluated.
Thus, neither the functional nor anatomical accounts seem
adequate at this point because there are reports of ostensibly
vivid, remote memories being spared (Bayley et al. [5, 6])
and cases with damage limited to the hippocampus proper,
MTL, or its projections, who show impaired memory even
at the most remote periods [8] (for more discussion, see
[53–55]). For many of the same reasons, other issues are
also unresolved, among them, the extent and nature of focal
RA, of transient global amnesia, of the correlation between
lesion size and extent of deficit ([29, 30, 32]; Gilboa et al.
2005), the unique contribution, if any, of the different
regions of the MTL, and of memory loss after different
types of dementia [25, 56, 59]. We believe that on balance
the neuropsychological evidence concerning the status of
remote memory in amnesia favors MTT, but we are aware
that some of the studies are inconclusive, and others are
open to different interpretations.
Some of the methodological problems associated with
studying the role of the hippocampus in remote memory
retrieval may be side-stepped by taking advantage of the
possibility that the same brain system enabling backward
mental time travel, e.g., memory retrieval, might also be
critically engaged in imagining events that never happened,
or that might happen in the future. This idea, brought to
prominence by Tulving [86] and discussed recently by
Schacter and Addis [76], has recently been tested in several
studies. Ryan et al. [74] showed that the hippocampus is
activated by such imaginings (see below). Given this, one
wonders whether amnesic patients can imagine fictional
events, either in the past or in the future. Rosenbaum et al.
(2003) showed that patient K.C. was markedly impaired at
imagining fictional events. Hassabis et al. [23] tested a
group of amnesic patients more extensively on their ability
to imagine specific future scenarios. All but one of the five
patients showed profound impairment at this task.4 What is
more, the nature of the defect was quite revealing. Patients
were incapable of generating a holistic representation of
any imagined environment within which experiences could
achieve coherence. As a consequence, they could only
generate fragments that never achieved the status of an
event. The authors conclude that the hippocampus “may
make a critical contribution to the creation of new
experiences by providing the spatial context into which
the disparate elements of an experience can be bound.
Given how closely imagined experiences match episodic
4 The patient who performed at control level had some remaining
hippocampal tissue, and the authors suppose that it was this remnant
that permitted imagining the future.
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memories, the absence of this function mediated by the
hippocampus may also fundamentally affect the ability to
vividly reexperience the past.” They go on to state that their
findings challenge the standard theory of memory consol-
idation but “accord well with suggestions that the hippo-
campus plays a critical role in imagining experiences
through the provision of spatial context, in perpetuity.” It
is particularly important that this study controlled for such
things as salience, a sense of presence, the anterograde
deficit of the patients, and any concerns one might have
about the veridicality of remote memory retrievals. In so
doing, this method offers a powerful approach to answering
questions about the role of the hippocampus in episodic
memory, and we imagine that future studies using this kind
of paradigm will be important in deciding between the
merits of SMC and MTT.
Semantic memory
In contrast to the controversy regarding episodic memory,
there is little dispute about the fate of semantic memory.
Consistent with both theories, RA for semantic information,
whether for facts about oneself, about public events,
personalities, or even vocabulary (see Table 1 in [55]), is
either spared or confined to a period of about 10 years if the
damage is limited primarily to the hippocampal formation.
RA can be more extensive if the damage includes other
MTL and neocortical structures, reaching the same level as
autobiographical memory loss in the latter case, or possibly
exceeding it in the case of patients from the series of
Bayley et al. [5, 6]; Bayley et al. 2006). In a cross-sectional
and longitudinal study of semantic memory for famous
names and vocabulary in patients with AD, Westmacott et
al. [92] showed that the extent and severity of RA increased
with disease progression, suggesting that RA for semantic
memory is related to the extent of neocortical atrophy.
Complicating the picture is the fact that semantic and
episodic memories are not independent of one another.
Semantic memory, for example, may benefit from episodic
memory. Westmacott and Moscovitch [91] reported that
episodic memory contributes to performance on tests of
semantic memory. Thus, reading times and categorization
by profession for famous names is faster and more accurate
if the name is associated with a recollection that is of
personal significance to the individual. For example, Elvis
Presley may be associated with a personal visit to Grace-
land, whereas Frank Sinatra holds no such personal
associations. Performance favors Elvis Presley, although
both people are equally famous. In surveying the popula-
tion, Westmacott and Moscovitch found that a common set
of famous people can elicit such associations in over 80%
of the population, whereas another set of equally famous
people rarely elicits them. Importantly, the distinction
between these two sets is absent or greatly diminished in
amnesic people, and their performance on the two semantic
tasks, naming and categorization, show no difference
between the two sets of names.
In recent work, Moscovitch et al. (in preparation) found
that in normal people, the extent to which recollection
contributes to semantic memory for names and for public
events diminishes with time, reaching an asymptote after 5–
10 years, indicating that the facts are retained but the
episodic component is absent. The temporal gradient found
on tests of semantic memory in people with damage
restricted to the MTL may reflect the loss of this episodic
component.
Studies with animals
Because of the control over conditions during acquisition
and retention, and over the location and size of lesions,
studies of nonhuman mammals may help resolve some of
the problems encountered in the human literature. Over the
years a number of paradigms have been developed to study
RA, primarily in rodents, and have yielded the same three
patterns of RA after lesions to the hippocampus and related
MTL structures in humans: RA with a temporal gradient,
extensive RA with no gradient, and no RA. For example,
several studies on contextual fear conditioning (e.g., [28])
and socially acquired taste preferences (e.g., [93]) have
reported temporally graded RA in rats with hippocampal
lesions. By contrast, in studies of remote spatial memory,
the typical finding is temporally extensive RA either
without a gradient (e.g., [58]), or with poorest memory for
the most remote time periods [94]. Finally, no RA is
reported on tasks in which there is no anterograde loss after
hippocampal lesions, such as procedural learning, single
object discrimination, or conditioning to unimodal stimuli,
such as tones.
In reviewing the evidence, Rosenbaum et al. [71]
accounted for much of it by positing that tests dependent
on relational context (e.g., allocentric and configural spatial
cues) produced a temporally extensive RA, whereas tests
that are less dependent on relational context (tone, taste, or
smell of conditioning stimulus) produced either a temporally
graded RA or no RA. Recent studies have confirmed this
hypothesis. Thus, memory for a hidden platform in a water
maze (e.g., [9, 45, 82] or for the rewarded side in a cross
maze [94, 95], both open to a complex environment, was
impaired after hippocampal lesions even if acquisition was
months earlier. RAwas not influenced by lesion size. On the
other hand, memory for particular objects either showed a
temporal gradient or no memory loss at all after hippocampal
lesions [58], but a temporally extensive RA after perirhinal
lesions in both rats [17, 57] and monkeys [84].
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If we consider memories dependent on relational context
to be analogous to episodic memory in humans, and the
other two types of memory to be analogous to familiarity or
semantic memory, then the general pattern of results
resembles that found in humans with hippocampal lesions.
This line of reasoning suggests a new interpretation of the
temporal gradient observed in certain tasks such as
contextual fear conditioning and acquired food preference.
Rather than view the temporal gradient as evidence in favor
of SMC, we can interpret it as evidence of transformation
of memory representations over time from ones that are
context-dependent shortly after acquisition, and rely on the
hippocampus, to ones that are less dependent on context
afterward, and, thus, exist independently of the hippocam-
pus. Consistent with the latter interpretation, a number of
investigators have shown that sensitivity to contextual
detail diminishes with time, such that animals generalize
conditioned behaviors to novel contexts as the retention
interval increases. This result has been obtained both in the
conditioned fear paradigm ([4, 39, 47]; Houston et al. 1999;
Wiltgen and Silva, submitted for publication; Winocur and
Moscovitch, submitted for publication) and in a socially
acquired food preference task (Winocur and Moscovitch,
submitted for publication). Similar transformations can
occur with respect to complex spatial memories. With time
and experience spatial memories are also transformed from
contextually dependent ones to more schematic ones that
can be sustained by extrahippocampal structures. In line
with this interpretation, Winocur et al. [94, 95] found that
rats reared in a complex environment learned the rewarded
locations in that environment, and retained those memories
even after hippocampal lesions. The same rats, however,
were impaired in acquiring new spatial memories in a
different environment. These results are consistent with
reports of the effects of hippocampal lesions on remote
spatial memory in humans, who can also navigate normally
in an environment learned long before they sustained their
damage. Although they base their navigation on a schema-
tic, map-like representation of the environment, they do not
retain details, which prevents them from recreating the
original environment and reexperiencing it in rich detail.
The absence of a detailed representation may also prevent
rodents and humans from navigating their environment
with optimum efficiency. Thus, even those rats with
hippocampal lesions who navigated the complex spatial
maze with relatively few errors chose less efficient routes to
rewarded locations than did intact animals (Winocur and
Moscovitch, in preparation).
The transformation hypothesis also helps explain some
intriguing results based on the so-called reconsolidation
paradigm. Once reactivated, a memory trace that was
presumably consolidated and no longer dependent on the
hippocampus becomes labile and susceptible to hippocam-
pal lesions shortly after it has been reactivated [34]. In other
words, once retrieved, a memory trace needs to be
reconsolidated or consolidated anew. We would suggest
that reconsolidation is a demonstration of the dynamic
nature of memory, always capable of being transformed
depending on the availability of cues. Reexposing the rat to
the initial training environment reactivates the original,
context-dependent memory representation that relies on the
hippocampus, and memory for the task once again becomes
susceptible to hippocampal lesions. As already noted,
sensitivity to context in contextual fear conditioning is
diminished with time, in keeping with its increasing
independence of the hippocampus. However, providing a
reminder restores that sensitivity (Winocur et al., in
preparation).
Hippocampal activation during retrieval
of remote memory?
Episodic memory
Most neuroimaging studies of autobiographical (episodic)
memory report equivalent activation in the MTL to retrieval
of recent and remote episodic memory, especially in the
hippocampus, as predicted by MTT and contrary to SMC.
This pattern of activation is obtained in PET and fMRI
regardless of the interval, which varies from days [69, 80]
to weeks ([37], in parahippocampal cortex) to decades [75]
or the particular procedures used to elicit and test
autobiographical memories: recognition of sentences de-
scribing events [40, 41, 43, 69] and reexperiencing events
in response to cue words [1, 2, 10, 21, 75], generic
sentences [69], and family photos [18]. Both hippocampi
are typically activated in comparison to a variety of
baseline tasks. Even in a person with hippocampal lesions
who was amnesic from early childhood, activation of
residual hippocampal tissue was found for the very few
remote episodic memories he had [43].
One criticism leveled against such neuroimaging studies
is that hippocampal activation might be associated with the
encoding of memories retrieved in the scanner, rather than
with retrieval of the memories themselves. A number of
controls suggest this is not the case. First, hippocampal
activations are not obtained for semantic or generic
memories retrieved in the scanner, which would presum-
ably also be encoded [40, 41, 43, 69, 87]. Second, the same
pattern of hippocampal activation during retrieval is found
even when the baseline (or comparison) event involves
generating a detailed imaginary scenario of an event that
participants never experienced [18]. This finding was
recently replicated in a study comparing real and imagined
events ([74]; Cox et al., in preparation), even though the
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imagined events were highly detailed and contained the same
components as real autobiographical experiences (e.g.,
including familiar people, places, and objects within the
imagined event). What is most interesting is that in the study
of Gilboa et al. [18], although there was equivalent
activation for vivid recent and remote memories, the
activations were distributed differently. Activations associ-
ated with recent memories clustered at the anterior end of
the hippocampus, whereas those associated with remote
memories were distributed throughout its length. These
results using imagined events as the baseline condition are
particularly striking in view of the recent finding, discussed
earlier, that the hippocampus is probably critical to such
imaginings [23]. This baseline condition must have acti-
vated the hippocampus, and the fact that remote memory
retrievals activated the hippocampus to a greater extent
shows that such retrievals constitute a very powerful
activator of hippocampal circuits.
A few studies show a temporal gradient of activation
[16, 66], but in these studies there was either no control for
vividness, number of details or personal significance [85],
or no effort was made to determine the contribution of these
variables, of which the former two are known to vary
inversely with the age of the memory. Eustache et al. [15]
note that older memories are typically sketchier and more
semantic than recent ones and Addis et al. [1] have shown
that hippocampal activation is modulated by vividness,
emotionality, and personal significance: memories rated
high on those qualities in the scanner led to greater
hippocampal activation. Although memory recency modu-
lated hippocampal activity, its effects were reduced or
eliminated when the above experiential factors were
included as covariates. Conversely, robust modulation of
hippocampal activation was observed for the three experi-
ential qualities even when recency was included as a
covariate (see also [21]). The only exception with regard to
recency is a study by Maguire and Frith [41] who found a
temporal gradient of activation in the right hippocampus in
older, but not younger, adults. The cause of this anomaly is
not apparent (see [18] for possible interpretation). Overall,
these studies provide strong support for predictions based
on MTT. Although hippocampal activation is moderated by
variables that may be related to the age of the memory, it is
important to note that no studies to date have shown a
complete lack of hippocampal activation for very remote
events, as SMC would predict.
Semantic memory
The neuroimaging evidence on semantic memory is less
consistent than that on episodic memory. There have been
fewer studies examining remote memory for personal
semantics or public knowledge of people and events, and
those have found either no hippocampal activation; hippo-
campal activation without a gradient for personal semantics,
knowledge of public events, [40] and famous faces [7, 27,
35]; or a temporally graded activation in right entorhinal
cortex to famous faces [22] and in right parahippocampal
cortex to names [12]. In all cases, the time range sampled
was greater than 20 years, extending as high as 50 years
[22]. The source of the discrepancy is difficult to determine
at present (see [55] for discussion).
The temporal gradient observed in some studies of
semantic memory is consistent with MTT and SMC in that
they both suggest that hippocampal involvement in reten-
tion and retrieval of semantic memory diminishes with
time. Other studies, reporting the absence of a temporal
gradient favor MTT to the extent that such gradients reflect
the contribution of an episodic component.
In addition to these studies of semantic memory, there
are a handful of functional neuroimaging studies on remote
spatial memory. Maguire et al. [42] tested the ability of
experienced London taxi drivers to find new routes from
one location to another when familiar routes were blocked.
They report hippocampal activation associated with success
in novel wayfinding, but the region of activation is in the
parahippocampal cortex, not in the hippocampus itself.
Likewise, in a test that required participants to reexperience
an event in a particular location (combined spatial and
autobiographical memory test), Niki and Luo [63] found
greater activation in the left parahippocampal gyrus when
contrasting recent (within 2 years) detailed events with
remote (7 years) detailed events. In a complex study
contrasting different types of spatial, semantic, and episodic
memory acquired recently (within weeks at most) or 4 years
earlier, Mayes et al. [46] report activation in the right body
and head of the hippocampus when contrasting the reliving
of an episode in a particular place (static episode) with
recalling the location of six towns on a map (semantic
spatial), with no effect of age. The hippocampal activation
might be related to the spatial nature of the memory, or to
the vividness (number of details of the environment and
autobiographical context) of the experience, much as was
found for hippocampal activation of episodic memory (see
above). In both of the studies, however, there was also
activation in precuneus, parietal, parahippocampal, and
posterior cingulate cortex, structures that appear to be part
of a spatial network [72].
Medial temporal regions may be particularly involved in
recollection of the spatial component of a memory,
although the particular site of activation may differ depend-
ing upon the specific requirements of the task. Hayes et al.
[24] had subjects view a videotaped tour of four houses,
and then compared activation for three aspects of episodic
memory; memory for objects, temporal order, and spatial
location of objects. Whereas activation in the hippocampus
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proper was similar across the three conditions, bilateral
parahippocampal cortex activation was greater for spatial
location compared to object and temporal order informa-
tion. Several recent studies in our laboratory (Ryan et al., in
preparation; Hoscheidt et al., in preparation) suggest that
this difference is observed regardless of whether the source
of the to-be-recalled information is episodic or semantic;
tasks that emphasize spatial location or spatial relations
show greater activation in parahippocampal cortex, hippo-
campus proper, or both. However, the activation within the
hippocampus proper during semantic retrieval occurs in the
anterior third of the hippocampus, whereas activation
associated with episodic retrieval is clearly posterior, often
extending into adjacent parahippocampal cortex.
Rosenbaum et al. [72] used a version of the Toronto
Public Places Test, modified for scanning. They found that
the hippocampus proper was not activated on any of the
tests more than on the baseline control task, although the
parahippocampal cortex was active, as noted by Maguire et
al. The level of activation in extrahippocampal regions
varied with the particular demands of each task. For
example, the superior-medial parietal cortex was implicated
more in egocentric tests of spatial memory, such as
landmark sequencing, whereas the retrosplenial cortex was
implicated more on allocentric tests, such as vector
mapping, distance judgments, and proximity judgments.
Memory for familiar places activates some of the same
regions and also parts of anterior, temporal cortex [20]. The
only evidence of hippocampal activation to familiar places
comes from studies in which there is some personal, spatial
reasoning [19, 33, 63], suggesting that the experiential
component might be crucial.
Neuroimaging evidence on remote spatial memory is
consistent with both MTT and SMC, which claim, for
different reasons, that remote spatial memories can exist
independently of the hippocampus. As we suggested
elsewhere [53–55, 70, 94, 95], it is possible that remote
spatial memories existing independently of the hippocam-
pus are coarser than those dependent on the hippocampus.
Conclusion
The literature provides relatively clear answers to the ques-
tions we raised at the outset to distinguish the SMC and MTT:
1. Are the remote memories retrieved by people with
MTL amnesia as fully detailed as the remote memories
retrieved by intact individuals?
When the most sensitive methods are used to assess
remembered detail, the data show that remote memories
retrieved by amnesic patients are detail-poor compared to the
remote memories retrieved by appropriate control subjects.
In both the spatial and nonspatial domains, remote memories
retrieved by amnesic patients lack rich contextual detail.
2. Is the hippocampal complex activated by retrieval of
remote episode memories?
The hippocampal complex is most definitely activated
during the retrieval of remote episodic memory. This does
not appear to reflect mere reencoding that might occur
when an old memory is brought back to conscious
awareness.
3. Do episodic and semantic memories suffer the same
fate during consolidation and in amnesia?
Most definitely not. In accordance with MTT, but not
with SMC, episodic and semantic memories fare quite
differently over the course of consolidation.
We submit that the empirical data are not consistent with
SMC. They are, however, consistent with many of the
assertions of MTT. However, there are aspects of MTT, at
least as first formulated, that are not so well supported. We
initially argued that the extent of the gradient in RA should
vary as a function of the size of the hippocampal complex
lesion [61]. This prediction was related to the notion that
each time an episodic memory is retrieved a “replicate”
trace is created within the hippocampal complex, spreading
out the representation of that memory. This spread would
mean that larger lesions are required to knock out older
memories, on average.
However, the evidence in support of these particular
predictions is inconsistent ([32], but see Gilboa et al. 2005),
suggesting that the specific mechanism we proposed to
account for the continuing hippocampal involvement in
episodic memory over time might have been incorrect. The
evidence strongly supports this continuing involvement,
however, so we should consider other mechanisms that
would accomplish this function.
Trace replication is but a specific example of the more
general idea that when an episode memory is reinstated, its
representation within hippocampal circuits is altered. Other
forms of alteration are possible, such as strengthening the
existing trace, or changing it by incorporating some new
information as represented in additional neuronal circuits.
In most circumstances this alteration will lead both to an
incorporation of new information into the memory trace,
and a concomitant strengthening of the trace as a result of
the reconsolidation process itself. Further discussion of this
possibility is beyond the scope of the present review, but
we imagine that development of this idea and the linkages
between MTT and reconsolidation will be well worth
pursuing in the future.
The evidence reviewed in this paper provides a unified
framework for conceptualizing hippocampal–neocortical
interactions [53, 54, 71]. In this framework, detailed
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representations of remote events (episodic, autobiographi-
cal memory in humans and context-dependent memory in
animals), including rich spatial representations of environ-
ments, are hippocampally dependent, whereas semantic
memories (context-free memories) and schematic or coarse
representations of the topography (sufficient to support
navigation) can exist independently of the hippocampus.
In many ways, the theoretical position espoused for the
role of the hippocampus in remote memory is congruent
with the emerging view of the hippocampus in recent
(anterograde) memory in humans and other animals: It is
needed to represent information that supports recollection
of the past, but not context-independent familiarity with it
([13, 14, 26, 52, 96], but see Wais et al. 2006). Insofar as
memories reflect detailed information, they will continue to
be dependent on the hippocampus. Memories, however, are
typically transformed with time, losing details and becom-
ing more schematic and scripted. What is more, retrieval
appears to reinstantiate a previously stored and consolidated
memory, which can then be transformed by the subsequent
retrieval context.
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